Enterprise DNAEnterprise DNA

Skills

hent-ai

by IYENTeam

Emotion Image Attachment Plugin for AI agents — Auto-classify emotions via LLM and attach matching images to Discord messages

Our verdict

Not reviewed yet

We have not reviewed hent-ai yet

No one at Enterprise DNA has checked this listing against its sources. The description comes from public listings gathered automatically. Any fact below shows where it came from and when it was last checked.

How we review records

From the listing

About hent-ai

hent-ai is a TypeScript plugin that automatically classifies emotions in Discord messages using an LLM and attaches matching images. It integrates with AI agents to enhance message responses with visual emotional context.

Best for

Developers building Discord bots that need emotional visual responses.

Use cases

  • Add emotional image reactions to AI agent responses in Discord
  • Automatically detect user sentiment and attach relevant images
  • Enhance chatbot interactions with visual feedback

Notes

70 stars on GitHub. Last updated 2026-10-26. Licensed MIT.

Pros

  • Simple integration as a plugin for AI agents
  • Leverages LLM for emotion classification
  • Open source with a permissive license

Cons

  • Requires an LLM API, adding external dependency
  • Limited to Discord platform
  • Small community (70 stars) may mean less support

Key facts

What we have checked

Days since the last commit
19
Checked GitHub
GitHub forks
8
Checked GitHub
GitHub stars
70
Checked GitHub
Days to a first reply on issues
75.7
Checked GitHub
Open issues
9
Checked GitHub
Releases in the last 90 days
1
Checked GitHub

Each value shows when we last confirmed it and where it came from. Values we have not confirmed are left out, never guessed.

Stars and usage

How hent-ai is growing

GitHub stars

70 to 70

stars. 1 Nov 2026 to 14 Nov 2026, 3 readings.

Source: GitHub. Checked .

Health and security

Is hent-ai looked after, and what do its setup files show

Health score

47 out of 100

Does someone look after this repository? It does not say the code is good or safe. Worked out from GitHub signals checked . How it is worked out

PartPointsWhat we saw
Recent activity30 of 30Last push 19 days ago
Releases7.5 of 151 release in 90 days
Issue replies0 of 20First reply in 75.7 days (median)
Maintainer0 of 15Owned by a single user
Official sourceNot countedMCP servers only

Security check static checks

30 out of 100

Reads what is published about the server: package advisories, licence, secrets in the documented setup and tool permissions. Nothing is installed or run, so this is not a security assessment. Checked by edna-skill-static-v1 main@b091cc474a6a. What it checks

  • Critical Tinypool: Prototype Pollution gadget in worker options leads to Remote Code Execution (affects tinypool 1.1.1, pinned in generate/package-lock.json).
  • Critical Tinypool: Prototype Pollution Gadget to RCE in run() options (affects tinypool 1.1.1, pinned in generate/package-lock.json).
  • Critical When Vitest UI server is listening, arbitrary file can be read and executed (affects vitest 3.2.4, pinned in package-lock.json).
  • High nanoid: non-secure generators can loop indefinitely with negative size (affects nanoid 3.3.12, pinned in generate/package-lock.json).
  • High nanoid: custom generators can loop indefinitely when size is zero (affects nanoid 3.3.12, pinned in generate/package-lock.json).
  • High PostCSS: Path Traversal in Previous Source Map Auto-Loading (sourceMappingURL) leads to Arbitrary .map File Disclosure (affects postcss 8.5.14, pinned in generate/package-lock.json).
  • High PostCSS: Path Traversal in Previous Source Map Auto-Loading (sourceMappingURL) leads to Arbitrary .map File Disclosure (affects postcss 8.5.15, pinned in service/package-lock.json).
  • High sharp inherited vulnerabilities in libvips: CVE-2026-33327, CVE-2026-33328, CVE-2026-35590, CVE-2026-35591 (affects sharp 0.34.5, pinned in generate/package-lock.json).
  • High sharp: Vulnerabilities in libheif: GHSA-g89c-p67h-r497 and GHSA-2jg2-4ch7-h545 (affects sharp 0.34.5, pinned in generate/package-lock.json).
  • High sharp : Vulnerability in librsvg dependency CVE-2026-96889 (affects sharp 0.34.5, pinned in generate/package-lock.json).
  • High source-map-js allows event-loop denial of service through indexed source-map section offsets (affects source-map-js 1.2.1, pinned in generate/package-lock.json).
  • High launch-editor: `fs.existsSync()` existence check can be bypassed on Windows (affects vite 7.3.3, pinned in package-lock.json).
  • High vite: `server.fs.deny` bypass on Windows alternate paths (affects vite 7.3.3, pinned in package-lock.json).
  • High launch-editor: `fs.existsSync()` existence check can be bypassed on Windows (affects vite 8.0.13, pinned in shared/package-lock.json).
  • High vite: `server.fs.deny` bypass on Windows alternate paths (affects vite 8.0.13, pinned in shared/package-lock.json).
  • High launch-editor: `fs.existsSync()` existence check can be bypassed on Windows (affects vite 8.0.16, pinned in service/package-lock.json).
  • Medium Vitest: Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Read via @vitest/mocker Redirect Mock (affects @vitest/mocker 3.2.4, pinned in generate/package-lock.json).
  • Medium Vitest: Code injection via unauthenticated manual mock registration (affects @vitest/mocker 3.2.4, pinned in generate/package-lock.json).
  • Medium Vitest: Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Read via @vitest/mocker Redirect Mock (affects @vitest/mocker 4.1.6, pinned in shared/package-lock.json).
  • Medium Vitest: Code injection via unauthenticated manual mock registration (affects @vitest/mocker 4.1.6, pinned in shared/package-lock.json).
  • Medium Vitest: Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Read via @vitest/mocker Redirect Mock (affects @vitest/mocker 4.1.8, pinned in service/package-lock.json).
  • Medium Vitest: Code injection via unauthenticated manual mock registration (affects @vitest/mocker 4.1.8, pinned in service/package-lock.json).
  • Medium PostCSS: incomplete fix of GHSA-6g55-p6wh-862q — attacker-controlled sourceMappingURL reads arbitrary .map files when `from` is unset (affects postcss 8.5.14, pinned in generate/package-lock.json).
  • Medium PostCSS: incomplete fix of GHSA-6g55-p6wh-862q — attacker-controlled sourceMappingURL reads arbitrary .map files when `from` is unset (affects postcss 8.5.15, pinned in service/package-lock.json).
  • Medium launch-editor: escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows (affects vite 7.3.3, pinned in package-lock.json).
  • Medium launch-editor: Editor CLI flag misinterpretation causing arbitrary command execution for some editors (affects vite 7.3.3, pinned in package-lock.json).
  • Medium Vite: Files outside `server.fs.allow` could be served when project paths match system paths on non-Windows machine (affects vite 7.3.3, pinned in package-lock.json).
  • Medium launch-editor: NTLMv2 hash disclosure via UNC path handling on Windows (affects vite 7.3.3, pinned in package-lock.json).
  • Medium launch-editor: escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows (affects vite 8.0.13, pinned in shared/package-lock.json).
  • Medium launch-editor: Editor CLI flag misinterpretation causing arbitrary command execution for some editors (affects vite 8.0.13, pinned in shared/package-lock.json).
  • Medium Vite: Files outside `server.fs.allow` could be served when project paths match system paths on non-Windows machine (affects vite 8.0.13, pinned in shared/package-lock.json).
  • Medium launch-editor: NTLMv2 hash disclosure via UNC path handling on Windows (affects vite 8.0.13, pinned in shared/package-lock.json).
  • Medium launch-editor: escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows (affects vite 8.0.16, pinned in service/package-lock.json).
  • Medium launch-editor: Editor CLI flag misinterpretation causing arbitrary command execution for some editors (affects vite 8.0.16, pinned in service/package-lock.json).
  • Medium Vite: Files outside `server.fs.allow` could be served when project paths match system paths on non-Windows machine (affects vite 8.0.16, pinned in service/package-lock.json).
  • Medium Vitest: Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Read via @vitest/mocker Redirect Mock (affects vitest 3.2.4, pinned in package-lock.json).
  • Medium Vitest: Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Read via @vitest/mocker Redirect Mock (affects vitest 4.1.6, pinned in shared/package-lock.json).
  • Medium Vitest: Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Read via @vitest/mocker Redirect Mock (affects vitest 4.1.8, pinned in service/package-lock.json).
  • Medium Reads or points the agent at stored credentials (a credential file in the home directory): generate/src/cli.ts, line 173.
  • Low esbuild allows arbitrary file read when running the development server on Windows (affects esbuild 0.27.7, pinned in generate/package-lock.json).
  • Low esbuild allows arbitrary file read when running the development server on Windows (affects esbuild 0.28.0, pinned in service/package-lock.json).
  • Low Vite: Cross origin script execution through Vite custom middleware (affects vite 7.3.3, pinned in package-lock.json).
  • Low Vite: Cross origin script execution through Vite custom middleware (affects vite 8.0.13, pinned in shared/package-lock.json).
  • Low Vite: Cross origin script execution through Vite custom middleware (affects vite 8.0.16, pinned in service/package-lock.json).
  • Note 116 files were not read (over 512 KB, or past the 60 file cap): openclaw/scripts/create_nibutani.ts, openclaw/scripts/set_channel_enabled.ts, openclaw/scripts/set_channel_mode.ts and more.
  • Note 2 of 337 packages are not pinned to one version, so only the malicious packages list was checked for them, not version advisories.

Sources

Where this comes from

  • GitHubRegistry

    Checked · Days since the last commit, GitHub forks, GitHub stars, Days to a first reply on issues, Open issues, Releases in the last 90 days

A source shows what was published when we checked it. It does not certify security, performance or a working installation. Read our method.

Changelog

What changed

  1. Security finding

    Source: osv.dev

  2. Security finding

    Source: osv.dev

  3. Security finding

    Source: osv.dev

  4. Security finding

    Source: osv.dev

  5. Security finding

    Source: osv.dev

  6. Security finding

    Source: osv.dev

  7. Security finding

    Source: osv.dev

  8. Security finding

    Source: osv.dev

  9. Security finding

    Source: osv.dev

  10. Security finding

    Source: osv.dev

  11. Security finding

    Source: osv.dev

  12. Security finding

    Source: osv.dev

  13. Security finding

    Source: osv.dev

  14. Security finding

    Source: osv.dev

  15. Security finding

    Source: osv.dev

  16. Security finding

    Source: osv.dev

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